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A
mAbstract
Hip implants have provided life-changing treatment, reducing pain and improving
the mobility and independence of patients. Success has encouraged manufacturers
to innovate and amend designs, engendering patient hopes in these devices.
However, failures of medical implants do occur. The failure rate of the Articular
Surface Replacement metal-on-metal hip system, implanted almost 100,000 times
world-wide, has re-opened debate about appropriate and timely implant
governance. As commercial interests, patient hopes, and devices’ governance
converge in a socio-technical crisis, we analyse the responses of relevant governance
stakeholders in the United Kingdom between 2007 and 2014. We argue that there
has been a systemic failure of the governance system entrusted with the safety of
patients fitted with medical implants. Commercial considerations of medical implants
and the status quo of medical implant governance have been given priority over
patient safety despite the availability of significant failure data in an example of
uncertainty about what constitutes appropriate precautionary action.
Keywords: Medical implant failure; Medical device; Governance; Precautionary
principle; DePuy ASR; Metal-on-metal hipsIntroduction
This paper examines a history of managing medical implant failure, specifically the re-
sponses of key stakeholders in an emergent realisation of failure. By ‘failure’ we refer to
guidelines by NICE (National Institute for Health and Care Excellence) (2002) which
stipulate a benchmark for hip implant revision of 10% at ten years, commonly trans-
lated to 1% per year of the life of the implanta. We draw on the example of DePuy
Orthopaedics’ Articular Surface Replacement (ASR™) hip system to show systemic
failure of medical implant governance in the United Kingdom (UK). The ASR™ is a
metal-on-metal (MoM) hip implant that was withdrawn from the market by the manu-
facturer on 26 August 2010. High revision rates of the ASR™ – at 7.5% in three years
(NJR 2009), more than twice the NICE benchmark – have led to the need to explant and
replace the artificial hip due to a risk of tissue damage caused by increased wear releasing
high concentrations of metal particles into the patient (Langton et al. 2011).Total hip replacement
Medical implants have had considerable impact on healthcare planning and provision –
both on the lives of patients and in commercial relevance to manufacturers, prompting2014 Wienroth et al.; licensee Springer. This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons
ttribution License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any
edium, provided the original work is properly credited.
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hip replacement had until very recently been celebrated as ‘the operation of the century’
(Learmonth et al. 2007: 1508) and considered to have been ‘one of the most successful op-
erations of the 20th century’ (Skinner and Kay 2011: 3009). For the majority of recipients
it is a positive, life changing intervention, leading to increased mobility and a reduction in
pain. The overall success of hip joint replacement has increased trust in the process of re-
placement surgery and in the prostheses, leading to an exploration of unmet need in some
groups of patients, which in turn has driven a desire to innovate on the part of the manu-
facturers. One area which was seen as promising for development was the provision of
prostheses for ‘young and active patients’ (Daniel et al. 2004: 177) who are ‘likely to outlive
a conventional primary total hip replacement’ (NICE 2002: 3). The challenge has been to
develop artificial joints which can withstand higher levels of activity over a greater number
of years than was the case previously. MoM hip designs were first tried unsuccessfully in
the 1950s and 1960s until improvements in manufacturing and measurement technolo-
gies encouraged designers to revisit MoM hips in the 1990s. Around the same time, man-
ufacturers were experimenting with a radically different design – resurfacing – where the
femoral stem (Figure 1) is much smaller, resulting in greater femoral bone conservation.
One of the first successful MoM hip resurfacing designs was the Birmingham Hip Resur-
facing (BHR™) which showed great promise with revision rates of 0.02% (1 out of 440 im-
plants) over a mean 3.3 years follow-up (Daniel et al. 2004).
Whilst total hip replacement has had considerable positive outcomes for patients, in
some cases medical implants have caused unexpected results detrimental to their de-
sired effect. Such adverse events raised awareness of inadequacies not only of device
development and testing, but also of device governance (Freemantle 2011; Riordan
et al. 1998; Sedrakyan 2012). In addition, it has been argued that new and innovative
designs of hip and knee implants show no benefits over older designs (Nieuwenhuijse
et al. 2014). Implants require particular care as they act in vivo and can have consider-
able impact on the surrounding tissue and wider metabolism. In considering shortfalls
in the testing, use and governance of MoM hip implants we are reminded of similar is-
sues which have arisen over the past two decades (cf. Anderson et al. 2007; Faulkner
2009) including: the 3M™ Capital™ hip (Muirhead-Allwood 1998; The Royal College of
Surgeons of England 2001) and the Sulzer Hip system failures (Stephens et al. 2006).
Despite these significant events the modes of governance of medical implants – profes-
sional, notifying and regulatory – were again shown to be lacking by the recent globalFigure 1 DePuy ASR™ resurfacing hip (note the small femoral stem right). To the left is the acetabular
cup and to the right is the single-piece femoral component.
Wienroth et al. Life Sciences, Society and Policy 2014, 10:19 Page 3 of 16
http://www.lsspjournal.com/content/10/1/19failures of the DePuy ASR™ hip, while problems with MoM hips in general continue to
be noted (Heneghan et al. 2012).
Aims of this paper
There has been much discussion elsewhere of mechanisms and regulation which permit
medical implants to enter the market without the need for simulator testing or clinical
trials (Cohen 2011; Curfman and Redberg 2011; Heneghan et al. 2011). This paper at-
tends to a later point in the process, and explores a question frequently articulated by
patients dealing with the consequences of failed MoM hip implants (House of Com-
mons Science and Technology Committee 2012): when data emerges indicating med-
ical implant failure at an unacceptable level, who then is responsible for responding to
those data, particularly for preventing harm to patients? By exploring the actions and
rationales of key stakeholders we argue that there has been systemic failure of implant
governance in the UK.
Success to failure: An introductory history of the ASR™ case
In 2003, the medical implant manufacturer DePuy Orthopaedics – a subsidiary of
Johnson & Johnson – introduced their own version of a MoM hip resurfacing, ASR™
(Figure 1). DePuy also offered the ASR™ XL, a total hip replacement version (Figure 2).
Both versions became available in Europe under the clause of ‘substantial equivalence’,
which permits fast-track market accreditation by claiming the implant in question is
similar to one already on the market (cf. The Council of the European Communities
1990: 4). The ASR™ hip resurfacing was not granted market approval by the Food and
Drug Administration (FDA) in the USA. The ASR™ XL was available worldwide includ-
ing the USA. It was to be these two versions that would fail in high numbers of patients
causing widespread health problems (Cohen 2011).
Problems with the ASR™ in the UK were first raised at orthopaedic conferences and
in journal publications in 2008. In 2009, the annual report published by the National
Joint Registry of England and Wales (NJR) showed relatively high revision rates for the
ASR™ hip resurfacing – 7.5% at three years (NJR 2009). However, official notices about
problems with the DePuy ASR™ were limited to guidance on positioning during surgery
(MHRA [Medicines and Healthcare products Regulatory Agency] 2010a) until August
2010 when DePuy Orthopaedics issued a global recall of all ASR™ XL and ASR™ hip
systems (DePuy Orthopaedics Inc. 2010, MHRA 2010d).Figure 2 DePuy ASR™ XL total hip replacement with conventional femoral stem (shown above
ruler). Femoral head is shown top left and the acetabular cup is shown top right.
Table 1 Simplified History of the ASRTM
2003 ASR™ resurfacing introduced
2007 High revision rates reported by Australian Orthopaedic Association, National Joint Replacement Registry
2008 Subsequent reporting of high revision rates by Australian Orthopaedic Association, National Joint
Replacement Registry
2009 First report of high revision rates in National Joint Registry of England and Wales
ASR™ withdrawn in Australia and New Zealand
2010 MHRA issues MDA on all MoM implants noting a small number of patients have adverse reactions
DePuy release guidance on positioning
MHRA issue MDA on positioning
DePuy withdraw the ASR™ globally
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a general Medical Device Alert (MDA) on 22 April 2010 for ‘All metal-on-metal
(MoM) hip replacements’ (MDA/2010/033), which noted that ‘a small number of pa-
tients implanted with these hips … develop progressive soft tissue reactions to the wear
debris associated with MoM articulations’ (MHRA 2010c). This MDA did not specific-
ally address ASR™ implants but showed that data had been available indicating general
concerns about MoM hip implants. It is worth noting that problems were picked up
earlier in Australia, where the registry first highlighted high revision rates of the ASR™
in 2007 (Australian Orthopaedic Association, 2007) and the ASR™ was withdrawn at
the end of 2009 (Australian Senate Community Affairs References Committee, 2011;
Therapeutic Goods Administration, 2011). These dates are summarised in Table 1.
MHRA Medicines and Healthcare products Regulatory Agency 2010a MHRA 2010a
The impact on patients is significant. Approximately 10,000 ASR™ hips were im-
planted in the UK. A failed MoM hip implant can cause both localised and systemic
health problems, and symptoms such as hearing loss, dizziness, decline in cognitive
function, cardiomyopathy and organ failure have been reported (Tower 2010; Mao
et al. 2011). For patients, these iatrogenic effects meant increased pain and decreased
mobility, affecting their social and family lives, their ability to work, to undertake hob-
bies and leisure activities; and often had a negative impact on their self-esteem and
mental health (McCormack and Joyce 2013).
Stakeholder responses
There are a number of organisations who play a significant role in the UK system of
post-market medical implant surveillance and regulation including: the manufacturers;
the main medical regulatory authority in the UK, the MHRA; the NJR database of im-
planted hip and knee joints; and orthopaedic surgeons who implant hips and their rep-
resentative professional bodies the British Orthopaedic Association (BOA) and the
British Hip Society (BHS). In addition, the MHRA appointed a Metal-on-Metal Expert
Advisory Group (EAG) in 2008 (MHRA 2010b), comprised of representatives from two
manufacturers, clinicians delegated by the BOA and the BHS, and MHRA staff.
The manufacturer
DePuy Orthopaedics was aware that data on the ASR™ in the Australian Joint Registry
from 2007 onwards, and the NJR of England and Wales from 2009, showed higher
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plicitly drawn to these high revision rates, and therefore to the real risk to patient
health, on several occasions in conference presentations, private correspondence and
meetings (Cohen 2011). DePuy’s first response was to displace responsibility from any
problem with the implant by advising surgeons to alter their implantation technique
(ibid.). Manufacturers have greater access to data on their products than any other
stakeholder does, in addition to extensive access to NJR data; they have internal data
on device design and feedback from surgeons on performance, meaning they should
have a fuller picture of how an implant is performing. It is not known how DePuy used
this privileged access to data above and beyond referencing implantation technique.
However, the company cited unpublished NJR data as one of the reasons for their
worldwide withdrawal of the ASR™ in August 2010 (DePuy Orthopaedics Inc. 2010).
Beyond external inputs to the manufacturer there were a number of internal studies
commissioned by DePuy between 2005 and 2011 that warned of the engineering defi-
cits of the ASR™ implants (Cohen 2012b). It is a source of conjecture among patients
globally as to how the ‘ASR story’ might have unfolded if DePuy had acted on known
problems and withdrawn the implant sooner than it did.
It should be recognised that DePuy have never accepted that there has been a defect
with the ASR™ hip, and this has been shown in the evidence they have offered in USA
courts. For example, it was reported that, at a trial in March 2013, ‘J&J attorney Richard
Sarver said the device was not defective’ (Bloomberg 2013a). Evidence presented in the
same court brings into question whether DePuy Orthopaedics took seriously, and was
transparent about, data which showed the implant could be harmful to patients (Meier
2013). In a major class action in the USA, at the end of 2013, Johnson and Johnson offered
a settlement to around 8,000 litigants, estimated at US$2.47 billion (Bloomberg 2013b). In
Australia, a legal class action was due to commence in early June 2014 but was postponed
until March 2015 when DePuy submitted 23,000 pages of additional documentation in
what an ASR™ patient described as ‘delay by avalanche’ (The Australian 2014). As such,
DePuy Orthopaedics (Johnson & Johnson) have fought and continue to fight expensive
and long-running legal battles to defend the ASR™.
In addition, government enquiries have questioned DePuy’s approach to dealing with
problems associated with the ASR™. The Australian Senate Community Affairs Refer-
ences Committee’s enquiry into ‘The regulatory standards for the approval of medical
devices in Australia’ (2011) voiced their concern:
The committee is deeply disturbed by what appears to be tardiness on the part of
JJM [Johnson & Johnson Medical, the parent company of DePuy] to act on known
problems with these devices. Many people could have avoided considerable pain,
suffering and diminished quality of life if the company had acted in a responsible
manner to known problems with these devices. In failing to respond to the
committee’s requests for information on this matter, JJM have only served to confirm
the committee’s views. (page 74)
In the UK, the House of Commons Science and Technology Committee noted during
their enquiry into the 'Regulation of medical implants in the EU and UK' (2012: 6) that
they were ‘very disappointed that we were not able to take oral evidence directly from
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device and pharmaceutical companies routinely claim that helping patients is at the
centre of their operations (Johnson & Johnson Medical Pty Ltd 2011: 4), a profit-led
business model is in place and is prioritised over protecting patients (compare with
Barbui et al. 2011; Gøtzsche and Jørgensen 2011; Rosch 2012).The regulator
The MHRA is an executive agency of the UK’s Department of Health whose task is to
‘safeguard public health through our primary role in ensuring that the products we
regulate meet required standards, that they work and are acceptably safe’ (MHRA
2013). In the case of the ASR™ hip it is therefore reasonable to ask why the MHRA did
not take precautions to safeguard the public’s health given mounting evidence about
implant failure.
Its MoM Expert Advisory Group (EAG) had been reporting more generally on MoM
hip replacements since 2008 and, it was claimed, met ‘regularly to evaluate new scien-
tific advice and observations from clinicians’ (MHRA 2012b). The EAG has only two
published outputs – advice on patient management and a summary report released in
October 2010, which looked at a range of MoM designs, but omitted the DePuy ASR™
implants (MHRA 2010b). As the ASR™ implants are a MoM design, one would expect
a discussion on emerging data on ASR™ failures to have been part of the Group’s work.
Furthermore, if the Group met regularly, more information on their work should be
available, for example the minutes of meetings whereby the Group’s discussions, ana-
lyses and progress might be determined. A request for information submitted to the
MHRA by the authors of this paper asking for access to relevant minutes, has not been
answered at the time of writing, although minutes from a predecessor EAG are publicly
available. If these records exist and the EAG was regularly briefing MHRA staff, why
are such deliberations not made public? This is particularly significant when taking into
account that key stakeholders such as the BOA cite delegating experts to the EAG as
one of their core contributions in the ASR™ case:
The information on failures of Metal on Metal implants accumulated slowly – as is
always the case – but came to a point when, based on Joint Registry data in Australia
and the UK, one implant in particular – De Puy’s ASR system – was identified as
performing significantly less well than others used to replace painful arthritic hip joints.
The BOA brought this to the attention of the MHRA, helped provide senior and expert
clinical input into the Expert Advisory Group on Metal on Metal Implants, and
addressed the question of how to monitor implants introduced by forming the
Orthopaedic Devices Evaluation Panel. (BOA British Orthopaedic Association 2014)
In its report on medical implant regulation, the House of Commons’ Science and Tech-
nology Committee raised similar concerns about secrecy around the work of another of
the MHRA’s internal deliberation bodies, the Committee on the Safety of Devices (CSD)b
(House of Commons Science and Technology Committee 2012), which may indicate an
institutional attitude of hesitancy in sharing on-going deliberations on medical implants.
It seems professionally remiss not to be making use of the combined expertise of a group
whose task is so closely linked to the unfolding of ‘one of the biggest disasters in
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protector of patient safety, helping to minimise the effects of the unfolding ASR™ failure.
The MHRA has a statutory leadership role in engaging with medical implant failures but
there is little evidence of it having provided leadership in ensuring patient well-being related
to the ASR™ hip replacement, which might have been pivotal in safeguarding the health of
those patients about to be implanted with the ASR™ in the UK and perhaps in other coun-
tries, too. The MHRA’s commitment to leading on ensuring the safety of medical implants
has been shown to be weak and their inaction has been criticised elsewhere (Horton 2012).
Yet the agency continues to see its actions as not just blameless but commendable. The
MHRA argues that it ‘was the first regulatory agency in the world to issue advice to clinicians
about MoM hip implants in April 2010’ (MHRA 2012c) and that it acted with precaution:As a precautionary measure, we have today issued updated patient management and
monitoring advice to surgeons and doctors … because this particular type of hip
replacement has a small risk of causing complications in patients. (MHRA 2012b,
our emphasis)
If the MHRA had been committed to precautionary governance of the implant with
patient safety in mind, it could have called for a moratorium on ASR™ implantation
based on data publicly released in the 2009 NJR report. Even such a date is relatively
late given that there had been concerns articulated in the Australian registry in 2007
and in journal publications from 2008 (Langton et al. 2008; Joyce et al. 2009). It was
these and subsequent journal publications which not only raised concerns over the per-
formance of the ASR™ but explained why the ASR™ hip was performing so poorly, es-
sentially due to a design defect which led to high wear of the MoM implant (Langton
et al. 2008; Joyce et al. 2009; Langton et al. 2011). Therefore, a definitive cause of poor
performance by the ASR™ was proposed and was available to counter any arguments
regarding technical uncertainty.
The NJR
Set up in 2002, the NJR ‘collects information on joint replacement surgery and monitors the
performance of joint replacement implants’ (NJR 2012: 15). Nearly a quarter – 23% – of its
Steering Committee representation is from industry. The registry publishes annual reports
on the performance of implant surgeries and claims to be able to identify poorly performing
implants quickly. For example, the Chairman’s Introduction to the 2009 report states:
As a result of outlier analysis by the NJR, the Medicines and Healthcare products
Regulatory Agency (MHRA) issued a device alert for an implant which has
subsequently been withdrawn by the manufacturer. We can now quickly inform
hospitals of potential problems, which significantly reduces the period between
identification of an issue and patient review. I believe we have demonstrated that the
Register is a tool for excellence and that it will enable continuing improvement in
best practice and patient care. (NJR 2009: 8)
The NJR therefore make an explicit link between their identification of high revision
rates and subsequent action taken by the MHRA to remove poorly performing
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named). The same 2009 report names the ASR™ as the hip resurfacing implant with the
highest revision rate (7.5% failure at three years, more than twice the NICE recommen-
dation) and yet the ASR™ was only removed from the market August 2010 by the
manufacturer. The NJR’s claim to be able to identify and remove poor implants from
the market efficiently and quickly, does not therefore appear to be borne out in the
case of the ASR™. This is confirmed in an analysis by authors who sit on the NJR Steer-
ing Committee:
The NJR did not confidently determine that there was a potential problem with the
ASR™ implant until the 2008 data were analyzed. The NJR reported the ASR™
implant to the MHRA in April 2010, at which time an MHRA device alert was
issued. (Tucker et al. 2011)
This analysis was effectively presented too late for those patients who were implanted
with the ASR™ hip throughout 2009 and 2010, as well as those implanted earlier and
reporting problems to their GPs and orthopaedic surgeons, and brings into question
the NJR’s ability, at that time, to be a tool for rapid identification of implants with high
revision rates.Professional bodies and orthopaedic surgeons
Surgeons tend to draw on guidance provided by their professional bodies, in this case
the British Orthopaedic Association (BOA) and its specialist offshoot the British Hip
Society (BHS). Prior to ASR™ withdrawal in 2010, neither body published formal guid-
ance or recommendations on the accumulating failure data. Instead, the BOA argues
that it engaged with the MHRA, in raising the regulator’s awareness of the ASR™ ‘per-
forming significantly less well than others’ (BOA [British Orthopaedic Association]
2014). In addition, it funded important research investigating the poor clinical perform-
ance of the ASR™. The BHS now recognises it could have acted differently, stating that
the professional bodies need to ‘be proactive if similar problems arise again’ (Bannister
2012). It is clear that surgeons responded individually to data about ASR™ failure which
emerged during professional conferences and in surgical journals:
Data critical of the performance of the ASR were presented at numerous scientific
meetings in 2008 and onward to the time of this writing, particularly at meetings of
the British Hip Society (BHS) and the British Orthopaedic Association (BOA). This
factor, rather than the MHRA alert in July 2010, almost certainly led to the
subsequent drop in sales of that implant. (Tucker et al. 2011: 40)
Orthopaedic surgeons opted to implant alternative hips to the ASR™ and it is probable
that the collective effect of these individual decisions impacted ASR™ sales figures, leading
to declining sales and the manufacturer’s decision to withdraw the implant: ‘DePuy decided
in 2009 that it would be discontinuing the ASR™ System as a result of declining demand’
(DePuy Orthopaedics Inc. 2010; see also: Bloomberg 2013c).
Some orthopaedic surgeons have recently introduced an initiative to allow a step-
wise, more controlled introduction for new implants in parallel to existing governance,
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be lauded, the website lists only eight orthopaedic products (as of 23 October 2014),
compared with 256 brands of hip implants (acetabular cups and femoral stems) alone
that were used in the UK in 2013 (NJR 2014: 67)c. It remains to be seen if this initiative
will find wider uptake in the future.
Governance failure as precautionary uncertainty
Whilst each stakeholder in hindsight seeks to explain or defend their actions, the ASR™
hip implant history speaks of a failure of governance in protecting patients. Despite the
MHRA retrospectively citing precautionary action in regard to patient management the
difficulty of ascertaining what constitutes appropriate precautionary action remains (cf.
Ahteensuu 2004). In practical terms, this means decision makers have to choose which
group or aspect of the system they prioritise for precautionary actions. Recent discus-
sion about precautionary approaches reveals wide gaps in the perception of what pre-
caution means for the governance of innovative science and technology (Bell 2013;
Brown 2013; Fuller 2013; Stilgoe 2013; Stirling 2013). One understanding of precaution
recurrent in ethical deliberations is responsibility towards persons and humankind. An-
other understanding, prevalent in European policy discourse of recent decades, has
shifted responsibility towards ensuring specific social relationships, such as a free mar-
ket, a stable and competitive economy, and civic subsidiarity. These two understandings
of precaution may not always compete, but in the case of medical implants they have ar-
guably rendered technological decision-making contentious. In the case of the ASR™ hip,
the data that was emerging should have provided a basis for developing a precautionary
assessment, particularly from the regulator and the manufacturer. The uncertainty around
this data which the MHRA and other stakeholders use as justification for not calling for a
moratorium on implantation, should actually have been deemed sufficient to employ pre-
caution in order to protect patients over macroeconomic or other systemic consider-
ations. For example, data showing the ASR™ had high revision rates compared to other
resurfacing hips was publicly available from 2007 onwards, yet at no time was it consid-
ered definitive enough to cease implantation – this only occurred with withdrawal of the
implant by the manufacturer. Such uncertainty can lead to considerable impact on those
people who are most vulnerable, i.e. patients, when the object of precaution – the stake-
holder seen as meriting protection – is not the vulnerable person or group but the
enacted system incorporating the problem.
How can the balancing of responsibilities be understood in the case of the ASR™?
First, the perspective of the regulator is shaped by its routine interactions. The medical
implant system is part of a larger healthcare system and consists of diverse social rela-
tionships between regulatory and other governance bodies, commercial organisations,
practitioner stakeholders such as surgeons, and patients. These interactions contribute
to the perpetuation of the governance system through informing, deliberating and
decision-making. Whilst patient safety has been written into the regulator’s mission,
there appears to have been little responsiveness to concerns and problems of patients
implanted with ASR™ hips, by MHRA decision-makers. If experiential data from pa-
tients had been assessed alongside quantitative data from the NJR, this should have
made a difference to the regulator’s assessment of which group to prioritise for precau-
tionary action. Second, the MHRA places their responsibility for medical implant safety
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keeping regulatory decisions confidential as suggested by their response to the Freedom
of Information request by the BMJ (Cohen 2011), and by including manufacturers,
healthcare professionals and the public in the post-market monitoring of implant safety
(e.g. MHRA 2012e: 10). It is our contention that the MHRA should refocus their atten-
tion on patients and prioritise their relationship with them over its myriad others.
Third, hip replacements have received much praise over the last decades, with reliabil-
ity lauded and improvement to patients’ lives widely accepted in society. Confidence in
the hip replacement is emblematic of the success of the UK healthcare system and its
governance yet when a product such as the ASR™ produces considerable adverse ef-
fects, confidence in medical implants is damaged. A quick decision on halting implant-
ation of the ASR™ and efficient management of those affected could have preserved
confidence in hip implants and the implant governance system in the UK.
Different perspectives, as different realities, shape expectations of what constitutes
adequate precautionary action. The MHRA presents itself as a champion of patients,
but operates as a champion of what can be described as the status quo between statisti-
cally safe healthcare provision and economic growth through medical devices and drugs
innovation (compare with Clark 2013). Different understandings of precautionary ac-
tion aside, the case of the ASR™ shows that patient safety should have priority over
other concerns as medical implants have very material, direct and long-lasting impact
on patients and their families.
The ASR™ as a ‘public experiment’
Social studies of science and technology have suggested that contemporary develop-
ment and deployment of new technologies increasingly takes place in wider social
spaces rather than in the protected space of the scientific laboratory. In such a
‘technological society’ (Barry 2001) the experimental space has extended to include
the market and consumers: society itself operates as a laboratory (Krohn and Weyer
1994; Nordmann 2009). One corollary of this development is that technoscientific
innovation can easily outpace its governance. In the experimental space of society
such innovations emerge in interplay with a wide range of social, institutional and
health-related changes and developments. They tend to be applied without adequate
capacity to develop understanding of the potential risks and impacts on health, be-
haviour, and practice. What amounts to the continuation of testing in the market
makes understanding and considering precautionary approaches crucial, so that in
cases of failure, existing and potential users of that technology can be protected,
fully informed, and not retained as further experimental subjects. One ASR™ patient
perspective brings this to life:
It is difficult as a victim to come to terms with the fact that, if I had received one of
the many, many proven hips that are available, I would be enjoying life without the
pain and suffering that will follow me for the rest of my life. It would have been that
easy. No second five–hour operation, no bone grafts, no splitting of my femur open
and putting it together with clamps and wire-caging, no pneumonia, no renal failure,
no second stay in intensive care, no pain, no pain–killing drugs, no stress for my wife
and family and no loss of what will amount to a minimum of $80,000 to myself and
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a medical trial, and I am one of the lucky ones. They value the quality of our lives
too cheaply. (Australian Senate Community Affairs References Committee 2011: 54)
A lack of patient-centred precaution has been traced in the case of the ASR™ and
other MoM hip implants resulting in a public experiment.
Despite the fact that these risks have been known and well documented for decades,
patients have been kept in the dark about their participation in what has effectively
been a large uncontrolled experiment. (Cohen 2012b: 1 – our emphasis)
In the case of the ASR™ hip, the lack of clinical trials and transparency around in-
vitro testing of hip replacements pre-market means that most data is collected during
market-wide use in patients. While institutions such as the MHRA and the NJR exist
to monitor post market use and respond to problems, the ASR™ hip case shows that
the governance parameters of this experiment were too unclear to ensure patient safety.
What renders science and technology governance more complicated is the uncertainty
inherent to these fields. For example, the NJR note that they may have drawn attention
to ASR™ failures sooner had their method of outlier analysis been more precise (NJR
2009: 12). This suggests that even control mechanisms themselves are processes that
require on-going refinement and can help to anticipate and respond only to a certain
degree.
The uncertainty in deciding on action that is most appropriate for responding to an
emerging problem is aggravated by the normativity of public experiments in which re-
sponsiveness to data is dependent on very visible outliers and that complications are
visible in the majority of patients (MHRA 2012a, 2012c, 2012d). The case of the ASR™
hip shows that the notion of society as a public laboratory, or experiment, becomes
problematic when opaque regulatory guidelines and monitoring processes cloud aware-
ness of problems reported by patients and surgeons by apparently ignoring some ave-
nues of information and prioritising others, and by not acknowledging that both the
implant and its governance are subject to uncertainty. This presents a state that may
require precautionary responsiveness in favour of those that are most affected by failure
of implants, the patients.Policy-commerce alignment
In the technological society the variability of governance parameters, and as such dis-
agreement as to what precautionary action encompasses, is further affected by the
alignment of policy with commercial interests where the notion of precaution can be
imagined as stifling innovation or as being unscientific. The recent inauguration of an
Innovation Office by the MHRA to support manufacturers in bringing new products to
the market is an indicator of the agency’s priorities and commitment to commercial in-
terests (Clark 2013).
It has been argued that commercial companies increasingly contribute to the de-
velopment of regulatory and testing regimes, to significantly influence the aim
and scope of testing systems that are part of technological regulation (Abraham and
Ballinger 2012; Lave et al. 2010). Their capacity to take such an influential role is
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market, neo-liberal thinking: science and technology as well as innovation policy
stakeholders have adopted a commercial prerogative, which in turn impacts on the
governance of science and technology research, development and deployment
(RD&D) in society. What is seen is the tendency to protect commercial interests
through policy and regulation, and an effort to retain the status quo of confidence
in existing regulation that allows as much space for commercial RD&D as possible
(cf. Di Mario et al. 2011).
Similarly, in cases of demonstrable and wide-reaching failure, the commercial pre-
rogative impacts on the ability to govern that failure, resulting in ‘civil dislocation’: the
mismatch between the functions that government institutions are supposed to perform
and their actual practice (Jasanoff 1997). In the ASR™ hip case it is possible to talk of
‘regulatory rigor mortis’ (Van Zwanenberg and Millstone 2005: 50) as such a civil dis-
location. No single stakeholder has resolutely responded to data on high revision rates
with a patient-centred precautionary approach that could have put patient safety before
commercial or other concerns. This was aggravated by a lack of de facto independence of
stakeholders (Busuioc et al. 2011; Makhashvili and Stephenson 2013), who are part of a
network of actors in which contributions and thus responsibility are shared. When regula-
tory bodies such as the MHRA have to balance patient well-being against the economic
interests of industry, then a precautionary decision in favour of patient safety may be seen
as having negative commercial impact. However, it can be argued that early intervention
in the ASR™ case would have reduced economic and confidence costs in the long run.
Conclusion
The precarious balance arising from precautionary uncertainty is the tip of the iceberg
of a systemic failure. The inability of regulators to respond robustly to emergent prob-
lems and their consequences in the ASR™ hip case is evidence of a medical implant
governance system that is not capable of protecting patient safety despite this being ar-
ticulated as its raison d’être. Instead, the stated independent position of the regulator –
independent from other actors – becomes visible for what it actually is: a tenuous net-
work of competing influences, interests, roles and responsibilities in which the safety of
a medical implant is constructed through the interpretation of its performance accord-
ing to underlying commercial interests. Post market surveillance is a significant aspect
of manufacturer governance of medical implantsd. They operate thus because other in-
terested actors within the system, including the regulator (see, e.g., BBC Newsnight
2012; Woods 2012), subscribe to the mechanism of the societal laboratorye and because
pre-market authorisation structures, such as substantial equivalence, are weak (Cohen
2012a). In the UK the implant governance system failed to learn thoroughly from the
3M™ Capital™ Hip failure, despite claims by the MHRA in 2012 of having responded to
emerging ASR™ data with patient safety in mind (MHRA 2012b). There is little evi-
dence as to the regulator’s internal negotiation of the situation, which is staggering,
given their role as a public body and the effect on patients’ lives. In the response to the
emergent and early indication of implant failure data we can see a network of various
stakeholders whose actions may be inhibited by: the potential of the manufacturer’s
legal response (Channel 4 2011); the regulator’s inherent alignment with commercial
imperatives; and institutional ambiguity about risks and remits.
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align in the health care context, and that this works to the detriment of patient safety. We
suggest that this is an inherent and entrenched aspect of medical implant governance in
the UK and the EU biased by the commercial prerogative of an economic European Com-
munity in the context of global economic competitiveness. The very recent discussion of
moving drugs and medical devices to the enterprise portfolio of the EU, rather than
health, only serves as additional evidence (European Public Health Alliance 2014).
Key stakeholders in the ASR™ story took too long to respond to emergent intelligence
and evidence of increased revision rates of the ASR™ hip design. The response by the
MHRA and the manufacturer, favouring commercial interests and confidence in the
existing status quo has played out to the detriment of patients and the notion of
health-care in the UK.
Endnotes
a NICE guidance was updated in February 2014, stating that ‘Only an artificial hip or
hip resurfacing with a replacement rate of less than 1 in 20 at 10 years should be used’:
http://www.nice.org.uk/guidance/ta304.
b Incidentally, the CSD commissioned the EAG on ‘Biological effects of metal wear
debris generated from hip implants: genotoxicity’ in 2006, in response to a report by
the Department of Health’s independent expert advisory Committee on Mutagenicity of
Chemicals in Food, Consumer Products and the Environment (COM). COM’s report
found ‘good evidence for an association between [metal-on-metal and metal-on-
polyethylene] hip replacements and increased genotoxicity in patients’ (EAG 2006: 2).
The EAG on genotoxicity was set up ‘with the remit of translating the conclusions
reached by the COM into advice for clinicians and patients’ (ibid.). In its last set of mi-
nutes this EAG noted problems with soft tissue reactions from metal debris (EAG
2010), leading the MHRA to set up a new EAG dedicated to assessing the significance
of soft tissue necrosis associated with MoM hip replacements. In this paper we look at
this last EAG, which met between January 2008 and March 2010.
c Updated information on prostheses used in hip, knee, ankle, elbow and shoulder re-
placements, as registered by the NJR, can be found at this web address: http://www.
njrreports.org.uk/implants. The latest available data stems from 2013.
d All devices require the ‘CE’ mark before entering the European market (The
Council of the European Communities 1993). With the submission for and the award
of the CE mark the device’s manufacturer (including those involved in device pack-
aging, labelling and distributing) accepts sole responsibility for the device and its func-
tioning (The European Parliament, and The Council of the European Union 2008).
e For example, the head of the MHRA claims that hip joints cannot be tested outside
the human body, despite machines to allow laboratory testing being first developed in
1966.
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